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Abstract
After imagining being stranded in the grasslands of a foreign land without any basic survival material and rating objects with
respect to their relevance in this situation, participants show superior memory performance for these objects compared to a
control scenario. A possible mechanism responsible for this memory advantage is the richness and distinctiveness with which
information is encoded in the survival-scenario condition. When confronted with the unusual task of thinking about how an
object can be used in a life-threatening context, participants will most likely consider both common and uncommon (i.e., novel)
functions of this object. These ideas about potential functions may later serve as powerful retrieval cues that boost memory
performance. We argue that objects differ in their potential to be used as novel, creative survival tools. Some objects may be low
in functional fixedness, meaning that it is possible to use them in many different ways. Other objects, in contrast, may be high in
functional fixedness, meaning that the possibilities to use them in non-standard ways is limited. We tested experimentally
whether functional fixedness of objects moderates the strength of the survival-processing advantage compared to a moving
control scenario. As predicted, we observed an interaction of the functional fixedness level with scenario type: The survival-
processingmemory advantage was more pronounced for objects low in functional fixedness compared to those high in functional
fixedness. These results are in line with the richness-of-encoding explanation of the survival-processing advantage.
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Introduction
An evolutionary perspective on human memory focuses on
the conditions under which our cognitive systems process
information especially well (Nairne, Thompson, &
Pandeirada, 2007). Consistent with ideas based on evolution-
ary psychology, experiments showed better memory for ma-
terial that is relevant for certain adaptive ends such as social
exchange (e.g., Buchner, Bell, Mehl, & Musch, 2009;
Kroneisen, Woehe, & Rausch, 2015), mating (Allan, Jones,
DeBruine, & Smith, 2012), or learning an association between
potentially dangerous stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders) and aver-
sive stimuli, such as shock (see Öhman & Mineka, 2001).
In the survival-processing paradigm, participants are
instructed to imagine being stranded in the grasslands of a
foreign land, without any food or water, and in danger of
predators. A list of items is then presented that participants
are required to rate with respect to their relevance in this sur-
vival scenario. In a later surprise retention test, words encoded
in this scenario are recalled better than words encoded in con-
trol scenarios such as imagining moving to a foreign country
(Nairne et al., 2007) or other deep-processing tasks such as
rating the pleasantness of words (e.g., Nairne, Pandeirada, &
Thompson, 2008; Nairne et al., 2007).
This so-called survival-processing effect has been shown
for various retention measures and different populations; it is
still found when survival processing is compared to other
memory-enhancing encoding tasks or alternative emotionally
arousing scenarios (Kang, McDermott, & Cohen, 2008;
Kroneisen & Makerud, 2017; Nairne et al., 2008; Otgaar &
Smeets, 2010; Röer, Bell, & Buchner, 2013;Weinstein, Bugg,
& Roediger, 2008). Furthermore, it was successfully
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replicated as part of the Open Science Collaboration project
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In sum, survival process-
ing seems to be one of the most efficient mnemonic proce-
dures known so far (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008a; but see
Klein, 2012).
According to Nairne and colleagues, the survival-
processing advantage provides evidence that human memory
has been selectively tuned during evolution to process and
retain information that is relevant to fitness (selective-tuning
hypothesis; Nairne, Vasconcelos, & Pandeirada, 2011). This
of course does not necessarily imply that a single cognitive
“survival module” underlies fitness processing in general.
Rather, a number of different domain-specific processes, like,
for example, a predator-retention mechanism, might be in-
volved (Nairne & Panderada, 2008b). Still, the question re-
mains which proximate cognitive mechanisms mediate the
survival-processing effect. Several explanations proposed in
the literature rely on efficient forms of encoding, storage, or
retrieval that are domain-general in nature and thus are asso-
ciated with good memory performance in general, not just in
survival contexts (see Erdfelder & Kroneisen, 2014, for a
review).
One of these hypotheses, already considered by Nairne
et al. (2007), posits that active elaboration and richness of
encoding triggered by the rating task underlies the survival-
processing advantage (Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011;
Kroneisen, Rummel, & Erdfelder, 2014, 2016). More specif-
ically, the richness-of-encoding hypothesis maintains that rel-
evance ratings implicitly encourage participants to think about
different uses of items in a complex survival context. These
additional thoughts about potential functions generated during
encoding, especially the uncommon and creative ideas, may
later serve as powerful retrieval cues in a surprise memory
test, thus boosting memory performance to the degree that
the test is sensitive to these cues. Direct memory tests such
as free recall will benefit from these processes.
Thinking about using a set of randomly compiled objects to
maximize chances of survival can be considered a difficult
problem-solving task (Bell, Röer, & Buchner, 2015;
Kroneisen, Erdfelder, & Buchner, 2013; Röer, Bell, &
Buchner, 2013). In line with this, Klein, Robertson, and
Delton (2010, 2011) showed that planning (which also in-
volves thoughts about object uses) may play a major role in
the survival-processing advantage. Bell et al. (2015) even
showed that instructions to think about how to use a specific
item increases the memory benefit compared to the standard
relevance-rating instructions. Bell and colleagues also came
up with an explanation for the latter effect: When confronted
with the unusual task of thinking about how an item can be
used in a survival situation, participants try harder to think not
only about the common functions of objects but also about
novel functions. However, to produce ideas about novel func-
tions of objects, they have to retrieve different object
characteristics (e.g., form, material, stability) from long-term
memory and then mentally simulate the use of the specific
item for this new situation. For example, when thinking about
the usefulness of bed sheets in a survival situation you can
think about their normal function (e.g., cover your bed, even if
the bed is just a place on the ground), as well as about novel
functions (e.g., transporting things, use as towel, use as tent).
In contrast, thinking about using sheets in more common con-
texts like moving to another city is more restricted to the usual
function of the object (covering your bed). Of course, it is still
possible to use a bed sheet in a more unusual way like wrap up
fragile objects. However, there is often no need to use items
outside their normal function in a moving scenario. In line
with this, Bell et al. (2015) reanalyzed data from Röer et al.
(2013) and found that ideas produced under survival instruc-
tions received higher creativity ratings from raters than the
ideas generated in the moving condition. Furthermore,
Wilson (2016) showed that the survival scenario elicited more
alternative uses in the Guilford’s Alternate Uses Test com-
pared to non-survival-related conditions.
However, the possibility of using objects in ways that
differ from their common function vary considerably be-
tween objects. Some items can be used in many novel ways
while others are more or less restricted to their typical
everyday function. We refer to such differences between
objects as differences in functional fixedness. The term
“functional fixedness” was already used by Duncker
(1945), and is an important phenomenon in problem-
solving research. In essence, it means that people focus
on a specific (common) function of an object while
overlooking other possible functions that might help to
solve a problem (Arnon & Kreitler, 1984). For example,
in the candle problem (Duncker, 1945), participants are
instructed to fix and light a candle on a wall. However,
they only have a matchbox and a box of thumbtacks be-
sides the candle to accomplish this task. To solve this prob-
lem, participants have to empty the box of thumbtacks, use
the thumbtacks to nail the box to the wall, put the candle
into the box, and light the candle with the match.
Functional fixedness means that participants struggle to
see the box as a device to hold the candle.
In line with these ideas, a string, for example, can be
seen as an object with many possibilities of using it in
novel ways. The functional fixedness of the object is thus
low. In contrast, a traffic light, for example, is more re-
stricted to its common function. Consequently, its func-
tional fixedness is high. This functional fixedness is inde-
pendent from the context in which these objects occur. In
the following experiment, we aimed to test whether func-
tional fixedness of objects affects the strength of the
survival-processing advantage as predicted – that is, low
functional fixedness is associated with stronger memory
benefits than high functional fixedness of objects.
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Pre-studies
As explained above, the richness-of-encoding hypothesis
maintains that the survival-processing advantage is due to
the stronger stimulation of ideas about the possible uses of
objects in survival compared to control contexts. These unique
ideas may later act as highly distinctive retrieval cues in the
retention task (Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011).
Bell et al. (2015) suggested that the survival condition trig-
gers participants to think about not only common but also
novel functions of objects. However, items differ in their po-
tential to use them in novel ways. The more novel functions
someone can think of, the more unique retrieval cues should
be available to guide the person in the later memory test.
Pre-study 1
Based on this reasoning, we wanted to create a list of words
that differ in their level of functional fixedness.
Method
Participants
Thirteen participants from the University of Koblenz-Landau
were asked to rate 32 words for concreteness, meaningfulness,
and vividness.
Design and procedure
In order to find a list of words, one of the authors searched
through the German dictionary to obtain a list of items that can
be assigned to either (a) items very restricted to their common
function such as a desktop (high functional fixedness) or (b)
items that can be used in many different and novel ways such
as a bed sheet (low functional fixedness). This resulted in a list
of 141 concrete words. In the next step, 15 participants rated
the degree of functional fixedness of these 141 concrete words
on a scale ranging from -2 (item can only be used for one
specific thing) to +2 (item can be used for a range of different
things). A total of 16 concrete words highest in functional
fixedness (MhighFF = -1.23, SDhighFF = 0.76) and 16 concrete
words lowest in functional fixedness (MlowFF = 1.23, SDlowFF
= 0.27) were chosen (see the Appendix for the full lists of
words). Thus, overall 32 target words were chosen. In a final
step, different participants were asked to rate these 32 words
for concreteness, meaningfulness, and vividness on a scale
ranging from 1 (abstract; low in meaningfulness; low in viv-
idness) to 5 (concrete; high in meaningfulness; high in
vividness).
Results
Differences between words high and low in functional fixed-
ness were negligible on all three dimensions (Table 1).
Pre-study 2
As mentioned above, we argue that objects high and low in
functional fixedness differ in their potential to use them in
novel ways. In order to test this for the words selected in
Pre-study 1, we conducted another pre-study.
Method
Participants
Thirty-seven psychology students (29 females) from the
University of Mannheim and the University of Trier partici-
pated for course credits. None of these participants took part in
Pre-study 1. Their age ranged from 19 to 40 years (M = 23.16,
SD = 5.86). Given N = 37, α = .05, and df = 36, a one-tailed
matched-pairs t-test can detect a medium effect size d = 0.5
(Cohen, 1988) with a power of 1-β = .91 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2009).
Design and procedure
Participants were tested online in sessions that lasted approx-
imately 20 min. After providing informed consent, partici-
pants responded to several items assessing demographic infor-
mation. Next, participants were told that they will see the
names of 32 objects for 30 s each. We asked them to provide
us with different ideas of how to use these objects. We explic-
itly told our participants that this task may be easy for some
objects and harder for others and instructed them to think of as
many ideas as possible for each object. Each word was shown
for exactly 30 s, immediately followed by the next word. This
task was preceded by a short practice trial, in which the par-
ticipants had to provide ideas for how to use the object “blan-
ket” for 30 s. Then, the 32 words from Pre-study 1 were
shown to each participant in random order.
Table 1 Means and standard deviations of participants’ ratings for
concreteness, meaningfulness, and vividness, shown separately for
words high and low in functional fixedness
High functional fixedness Low functional fixedness
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Concreteness 4.28 (0.53) 4.24 (0.46)
Meaningfulness 3.29 (0.88) 2.97 (0.97)
Vividness 3.96 (0.65) 4.10 (0.57)
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Results
We counted the number of ideas each participant provided.
For words low in functional fixedness more ideas were created
(MlowFF = 3.89, SDlowFF = 1.19) than for words high in func-
tional fixedness (MhighFF = 2.97, SDhighFF = 1.27; t(36) = −
9.58, p < .001, estimated d = − 0.75). In line with the ratings
provided in Pre-study 1, words low in functional fixedness
enabled participants to generate more ideas about potential
uses than words high in functional fixedness.
Main experiment
Using the word sets preselected and validated in Pre-studies 1
and 2, we tested our hypothesis that functional fixedness of
objects affects the number of words recalled. Specifically,
words describing objects low in functional fixedness should
be recalled better. Furthermore, we predicted an interaction
between functional fixedness and scenario: Words low in
functional fixedness should benefit more from the survival-
processing advantage than words high in functional fixedness.
Method
Participants
One hundred and forty-one students (125 female) from the
University of Koblenz-Landau participated. None of these
participants took part in the pre-studies. They received a mon-
etary compensation. Their age ranged from 18 to 31 years (M
= 21.59, SD = 2.37). For a medium effect size f = 0.25 (Cohen,
1988), α = .05, and df1 = 1, df2 = 139, the power to detect a
significant interaction of a between-Ss and a within-Ss factor
in our design (see below) exceeds .99 (Faul et al., 2009).
Apparatus and materials
We used the 32 words from the pre-studies as targets in the
encoding phase, of which 16 were high and 16 were low in
functional fixedness. To absorb primacy and recency effects,
we added six buffer words, three at the beginning and three at
the end of the list. Apart from the buffer words, all words were
presented in randomorder. Except for language, the survival and
moving scenario descriptions were identical to those used by
Nairne et al. (2007). All materials were presented in German.
Design
A 2 (scenario: survival vs. moving) × 2 (functional fixedness:
high vs. low) mixed design was used. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to either the survival (N = 71) or the moving
(N = 70) scenario (between-subjects factor). Participants of
both conditions rated 32 words according to their relevance.
These words were either high (16 items) or low (16 items) in
functional fixedness (within-subjects factor).
Recall performance, response latencies, and relevance rat-
ings served as dependent variables.
Procedure
Participantswere tested in groups ranging in size fromone to four
in a lab in Landau. Each session lasted approximately 25 min.
Stimuli were presented and controlled by personal computers,
and participants entered their responses using the keyboard.
Depending on the experimental condition, participants were
asked to rate words according to their relevance for either the
survival or the moving scenario. Stimuli were presented one at a
time for 5 s each, and participants were asked to rate the words
on a 5-point scale, with 1 indicating “absolutely not relevant”
and 5 “extremely relevant” to the current scenario. They had to
respond within 5 s. If they did not respond within this time limit,
a warning message occurred and the next word was presented.
This would result in a trial without rating or response-time ac-
quisition. The rating task was preceded by a short practice trial,
in which two words had to be rated for relevance. After the
rating task, participants performed a distractor task (i.e., filling
in an unrelated questionnaire) for 12 min and were then unex-
pectedly prompted with a free-recall test for the words previous-
ly processed in the relevance-rating task. Similar to other exper-
iments using the survival-processing paradigm (e.g., Kroneisen
&Makerud, 2017), the final recall phase lasted for 8 min. It was
not possible to terminate the recall phase earlier than 8 min. At
the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed and
thanked for their participation.
Results
The significance level was set toα = .05 for all statistical tests.
Relevance ratings were provided for 99.93% of the presented
words. Overall, there were 32 missed trials. Eighteen subjects
did not provide a response for all the words presented to them.
The mean proportions of correct free recall for both scenarios,
separately for words high and low in functional fixedness, are
shown in Fig. 1 (MSurvivalFFhigh = .42, MSurvivalFFlow = .60,
MMovingFFhigh = .34,MMovingFFlow = .46; range of words recalled:
5–25). A 2 (scenario) × 2 (functional fixedness) mixed ANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of scenario, F 1; 139ð Þ ¼
31:70; p < :001; η2p ¼ :19.Words processed in a survival sce-
nario were recalled better than words processed in a moving
scenario. There was also a significant main effect of functional
fixedness, F 1; 139ð Þ ¼ 135:50; p < :001; η2p ¼ :49. Words
low in functional fixedness were remembered better than words
high in functional fixedness. The interaction between scenario
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and functional fixedness was also significant, F 1; 139ð Þ ¼
8:32; p ¼ :005; η2p ¼ :06:
Table 2 presents the median response times for the rele-
vance ratings, separately for each scenario and word type.
Response times for the ratings did not differ significantly be-
tween the scenarios, F 1; 139ð Þ ¼ 1:58; p ¼ :21; η2p ¼ :01:
There was a main effect for functional fixedness, F 1; 139ð Þ
¼ 14:65; p < :001; η2p ¼ :10: Response times for the words
high in functional fixedness were significantly longer than those
for words low in functional fixedness. There was also a signif-
icant interaction between scenario and functional fixedness,
F 1; 139ð Þ ¼ 27:43; p < :001; η2p ¼ :16, indicating that re-
sponse times for ratings took longest when words were high in
functional fixedness and processed in the survival scenario.
Figure 2 displays recall performance as a function of the
relevance ratings provided in the encoding phase. Obviously,
higher relevance ratings are associated with higher levels of
recall. Controlling for overall recall performance of the partic-
ipants, in the survival condition the partial correlation between
ratings and recall rates was significant for the words high (r =
.24; p < .001) and low (r = .08; p < .009) in functional fixed-
ness. The same pattern can be found for words processed in
the moving scenario (partial correlation for words high in
functional fixedness: r = .32; p < .001, and words low in
functional fixedness: r = .23; p < .001). We also tested
whether and – if so how – the effects of scenario and func-
tional fixedness on recall performance are moderated by the
relevance ratings the words receive in the encoding phase. To
answer this question, it was necessary to combine ratings to
cruder rating categories. Working with the original ratings
would have implied a loss of 107 participants from the anal-
ysis because not every participant made use of every possible
rating category. To avoid such a serious loss of data, we split
the ratings in two categories with low (i.e., ratings 1–3) versus
high (i.e., ratings 4 and 5) relevance judgments. Using this
approach, only 13 participants had to be excluded because
they did not provide data for every rating category (low vs.
high), leaving a sample of N = 128 participants for analysis.
Table 3 presents the mean recall proportions of this sample for
the low (left side) versus high (right side) rating categories,
separately for scenario and functional fixedness. A 2
(scenario) × 2 (functional fixedness) × 2 (rating categories)
mixed ANOVA revealed significant main effects of scenario
(F 1; 126ð Þ ¼ 15:40; p < :001; η2p ¼ :11 ), functional fixed-
ness (F 1; 126ð Þ ¼ 48:04; p < :001; η2p ¼ :28 ), and ratings,
F 1; 126ð Þ ¼ 126:73; p < :001; η2p ¼ :50. The interactions
between scenario and ratings (F 1; 126ð Þ ¼ 7:83; p ¼ :006;
η2p ¼ :06Þ; and between functional fixedness and ratings
Fig. 1 Mean proportion of correct recall for each scenario, shown separately for words high and low in functional fixedness. The error bars represent
standard errors of the means
Table 2 Means and standard errors of participants’ median rating
latencies for each scenario, shown separately for words high and low in
functional fixedness
Scenario Fixedness Rating latency (ms)
Mean (SEM)
Survival High 2,373.44 (56.39)
Low 2,052.49 (56.32)
Moving High 2,098.33 (56.39)
Low 2,148.24 (56.32)
Table 3 Means and standard deviation of participants’ recall
proportions for each scenario, shown separately for words high and low
in functional fixedness and words receiving low (1–3) versus high (4–5)
relevance ratings
Low rating (1–3) High rating (4–5)
Functional fixedness Functional fixedness
High Low High Low
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Survival 0.34 (0.03) 0.60 (0.03) 0.66 (0.03) 0.63 (0.03)
Moving 0.25 (0.03) 0.38 (0.03) 0.55 (0.03) 0.65 (0.03)
Psychon Bull Rev
was also significant, F 1; 126ð Þ ¼ 26:72; p < :001; η2p ¼
:17. The interaction between scenario and functional fixed-
ness was not significant, F 1; 126ð Þ < 0:01; p ¼ :99; η2p
< :001. More importantly, the three-way interaction between
scenario, functional fixedness, and ratings was significant,
(F 1; 126ð Þ ¼ 17:04; p < :001; η2p ¼ :12 ), showing that
the two-way interaction between scenario and functional
fixedness evident in the aggregate data (see Fig. 1) is very
pronounced for words with low relevance ratings and does
not show up in high ratings (see Table 3). Also, the main
effects of scenario and functional fixedness largely disappear
for words with high relevance ratings, as evidenced by the
significant two-way interactions involving the rating level.
Discussion
It is reasonable to assume that ourmemory systems have evolved
to help us survive and thereby enhance our fitness (Nairne &
Pandeirada, 2010). Researchers suggested that the survival-
processing effect reflects how specific selection pressures shaped
these memory systems (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008b, 2010;
Weinstein et al., 2008). In line with these ideas, the survival-
processing advantage proved to be a very robust and stable effect
that is found in different populations (e.g., Kroneisen &
Makerud, 2017; Nairne et al., 2007; Otgaar et al., 2010). It was
replicated both in older adults (Nouchi, 2012) and in children
(Aslan & Bäuml, 2012; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). These well-
replicated results have been argued to guide our understanding of
cognitive “biases or tunings” (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010, p.2)
that helped humans survive in ancestral environments.
However, our understanding of the survival-processing effect
would remain incomplete without an understanding of the prox-
imate cognitive mechanisms producing this benefit. One class of
proximate explanations focuses on the nature of incidental
encoding during the relevance-rating task. The richness of
encoding hypothesis maintains that survival processing stimu-
lates participants to generate a variety of both usual and unusual
ideas on how to use objects to survive (e.g., using a chair to fight
off a tiger). These ideasmay later serve as powerful retrieval cues
in the unexpected memory test. In contrast, scenarios such as the
moving scenario provide less opportunity to come upwith diver-
gent ideas about how to use these objects (e.g., a chair can be
used to sit on it or to stand on it while attaching something).
Consistent with this hypothesis, Röer et al. (2013) showed that
the survival scenario encourages participants to generate more
ideas about how to use items. Furthermore, the strength of the
survival-processing advantage tends to increase with the number
of unique relevance arguments generated per item.
Consequently, treatments that hinder or interfere with the gener-
ation of many creative ideas in the survival scenario reduce or
even abolish the effect (Kroneisen & Erdfelder, 2011; Kroneisen
et al., 2013; Kroneisen et al., 2014, 2016).
Bell et al. (2015) argued that thinking about novel uses of
objects requires retrieving characteristics of these objects (e.g.,
form, material, stability) from long-term memory and then sim-
ulating their use in the given situation. We showed that objects
differ in their potential to use them in novel ways. Some items
can be used in many different ways. These items have a very
low level of functional fixedness. Other items can mainly be
used for their common function. They have a high degree of
functional fixedness. Based on these ideas, we created wordlists
of objects that differed in their level of functional fixedness. We
assumed that objects low in functional fixedness allow partici-
pants to create many different and novel using functions, inde-
pendently of the scenario. Therefore, for these words, a higher
number of retrieval cues can be created and used in the later
recall task. This effect should be especially pronounced in the
survival condition because novel, creative ideas that maximize
chances of survival are a key component of this scenario. The
moving scenario, in contrast, prompts people to think about
prototypical uses of objects in the first place.
Fig. 2 Mean proportions of correct recall for each scenario, shown separately for words high and low in functional fixedness and each rating category.
The error bars represent standard errors of the means
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We experimentally tested the effect of an item’s functional
fixedness on memory performance in the survival and the
moving scenario. Replicating prior findings, participants
who evaluated words in the context of an imagined survival
scenario demonstrated enhanced performance on a later mem-
ory test. In addition, we observed an effect of functional fixed-
ness: Words low in functional fixedness were remembered
better. Furthermore, we found a significant interaction be-
tween functional fixedness and scenario: The survival-
processing benefit was strongest for words low in functional
fixedness. All three effects are in line with our hypotheses.
Participants took more time to rate the relevance of words
high in functional fixedness. Furthermore, we found that rat-
ings required most time when the words high in functional
fixedness were processed in the survival scenario, suggesting
that participants struggled to find useful functions for these
objects, especially in the survival condition.
Consistent with previous findings (e.g., Aslan & Bäuml,
2012; Butler et al., 2009; Kroneisen &Makerud, 2017; Nairne
et al., 2007), congruity had an effect on memory performance:
Higher relevance ratings were associated with higher recall
rates. Overall, items that are congruent with or relevant for
the processing task are remembered better. One interpretation
of these congruency effects is that congruent items stimulate
more ideas about possible uses of these objects (Bell, Röer, &
Buchner, 2013). Röer et al. (2013) demonstrated that congru-
ency effects in the survival-processing paradigm can be ex-
plained by the number of ideas generated during encoding.
Their participants generated more ideas in response to
scenario-congruent than to scenario-incongruent items.
In our experiment, both the survival-processing advantage
and the low-functional fixedness advantage hold even if the
relevance-rating level is controlled for (see Fig. 2). This find-
ing is important because it shows that both the survival-
processing advantage and the low-functional fixedness benefit
cannot be explained as by-products of simple congruency ef-
fects. Moreover, either effect tends to be more pronounced for
low ratings compared to high ratings (cf. Fig. 2). Why should
this be the case? As discussed above, the survival scenario
encourages participants to generate creative ideas about how
to use items. This effect should be strongest for items that do
not fit in the scenario (i.e., objects with low relevance ratings),
because in these cases people are forced to think about novel
uses of these objects. In addition, it is easier to find novel uses
for items with low functional fixedness, resulting in strongest
memory benefits when survival-processing refers to scenario-
incongruent items low in functional fixedness. Thus, the ob-
served result pattern is perfectly in line with the richness of the
encoding explanation of survival-processing benefits.
In sum, we learned more about the processes underlying
the survival-processing effect. Our results support the idea that
survival processing involves thinking about common and
novel functions of objects when rating the relevance of items.
In contrast, the moving scenario mainly involves thinking
about common uses of objects. The more novel and distinct
functions of objects a person is able to generate, the better later
memory retrieval. As shown in our present research, both the
stimulating survival-processing context and low functional
fixedness of objects contribute to this memory advantage.
Open practices statement The word material for the main
experiment can be found in the Appendix. The experiment
was not preregistered.
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Appendix
Table 4 Word material used in the experiment. In the English
translation the same word (battery) is used for two different German
words (Akku and Batterie)









Ampel Traffic light High -1.80
Anker Anchor High -1.13
Batterie Battery High -1.47
Bügeleisen Flat iron High -1.53
Desktop Desktop High -1.53
Gießkanne Watering can High -1.27




Radio Radio High -1.80
Reißverschluss Zipper High -1.13
Tacker Stapler High -1.60




Walze Roller High -1.07
Winkelmaß Goniometer High -1.33
Alufolie Tinfoil Low 1.27
Band Ribbon Low 1.13
Brett Plank Low 1.47
Draht Wire Low 1.27
Eimer Bucket Low 1.07
Faden Thread Low 1.33
Holz Timber Low 1.87
Karton Carton Low 1.13
Laken Sheet Low 0.80
Netz Net Low 1.27
Palette Palette Low 1.07
Papier Paper Low 1.73
Sack Sack Low 1.07
Schnur String Low 1.13
Stein Stone Low 1.07
Stock Stick Low 1.07
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long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes weremade. The images or other third party material in this article
are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated
otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
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